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Dillon v. Legg (Cal. 1968).

On September 27, 1964, while walking across a street near her
home, Erin Lee Dillon was struck and killed by the defendant's
automobile. Cheryl Dillon, the decedent's sister, was standing near
the street and may have been in peril of physical impact while Mrs.
Margery Dillon, the decedent's mother, who also viewed the
accident, was not placed in physical danger.' Both Mrs. Dillon and
Cheryl Dillon suffered emotional shock and illness following the
.accident. On December 30, 1964, Mrs. Dillon-together with her
daughter Cheryl-brought an action against the defendant for
negligently inflicted mental distress and attending physical
injuries.2 The superior court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment against Mrs. Dillon on the ground that she
was not in the zone of danger.3 The Supreme Court of California
reversed, holding that Mrs. Dillon's allegation of negligently
inflicted emotional distress had established a prima facie case.
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Adv. Cal. 766, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72
(1968).
Viewed against the background of the historical development
of the law concerning plaintiff's recovery for negligently inflicted
mental distress, Dillon v. Legg represents a significant change in

the law of torts. Initially, at common law, plaintiffs were denied
recovery unless they proved a contemporaneous physical impact. 4

The rationale of this strict common law rule was the speculative
nature of damages and the difficulties of proof.' However,
1. "There is general agreement that plaintiff Margery M. Dillon was, at the time of the
accident, either sitting or standing on the porch of her residence which is set back from and
fronts onto, Bluegrass road." Brief for Appellee at 2, Dillon v. Legg, 68 Adv. Cal. 766, 441
P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
2. Mrs. Dillon also sought damages for the wrongful death of her daughter. Id. at 769,
441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
3. The trial court denied the motion for judgment on the pleadings against Cheryl
Dillon because she may have been within the zone of danger or feared for her own safety. Id.
at 771,441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
4. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) which was
subsequently overruled in Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961).
Victorian Ry. Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888). This case was
disapproved in Dulieu v. White& Sons, 2 K.B. 669 (1901).
5. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 115 N.Y. at 110, 45 N.E. at 354-55.
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disenchanted with the harsh and unfair results engendered by the
application of this rule, the majority of the American
jurisdictions-as well as the Restatement-eliminated the necessity
of impact. 6 In order for the plaintiff to recover, these courts require
him to be within the zone of physical danger; they deny recovery

when the plaintiff is not personally endangered by the risk of
physical harm. The adoption of this limitation, it is argued,

facilitates adjudication by providing the jury with an effective
standard in determining whether an individual is entitled to
compensation. Moreover, this guideline is more advantageous than

the impact rule in that it recognizes the possibility that individuals
who do not sustain injuries due to physical impact may nevertheless
be endangered by physical peril and consequently may foreseeably
7
suffer emotional distress and resulting physical injuries.

Prior to Dillon, the California rule as to the limitation of the
legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff was set forth in
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. where the California

Supreme Court affirmed its support for the zone of danger
limitation.8
6. Belt v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.. 195 F. 2d 241 (10th Cir. 1952): Strazza v.
McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 156 A.2d 149 (1959); Salmi v. Columbia & N. River Ry. Co.,
75 Ore. 200, 146 P. 819 (1915); Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distributing Co., 232 S.C.
593, 103 S.E.2d 265 (1958); O'Mear v. Russell, 90 Wash. 557, 156 P. 550 (1916); Colla v.
Mandella, I Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957). A small minority of American jurisdictions still follow the impact rule. See Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263
(1958). The Restatement requires that the negligence of the defendant create an unreasonable risk of physical harm to the plaintiff. RESTATEMENT (SEcoNDI OF TORTS § 313
(1965).
7. Waubev. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 612-13, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935).
8. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
The majority of American jurisdictions allow recovery where the plaintiff is within the
zone of danger. The American Law Institute is in accord with this view. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 313(2) and comment d (1965). Some courts that follow this view also
require that the plaintiff's emotional distress result from apprehension as to his own safety,
and not fear for the peril of another. See Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 156 A.2d
149 (1959); Klassa v. Milwaukee Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956); Waubev.
Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). Other jurisdictions allow recovery even
where the plaintiff fears for the peril of another so long as plaintiff is within the zone of
physical impact. See Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933); Frazee v.
Western Dairy Products Co., 182 Wash. 578, 47 P.2d 1037 (1935). See also W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS § 55 (3d ed. 1964).
It is not clear whether the California view as defined by Amaya required the plaintiff to
suffer emotional distress from fear of his own peril as a prerequisite fo recovery. However,
the dissent interprets the opinion of the court as requiring only that the plaintiff be in peril of
physical impact. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d at 318, 379 P.2d at 527,
29 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
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The factual situation in A maya was similar to that presented
in Dillon. Lilian Amaya, who was in close proximity, witnessed her
17 month old son being crushed to death by a truck. Although
plaintiff did not fear for her own safety and was not within the zone
of danger, she nevertheless suffered severe emotional distress
causing physical injuries.
The Amaya court denied recovery upon an analysis of
administrative, socio-economic and moral considerations. The
court reasoned that the proof of psychoneurotic disorders9 presents
the possibility that the jury might decide liability on sentimental
grounds rather than on the bases of medical evidence and legal
standards of proof and causation. Therefore, the court prophesied
that effective adjudication would be impossible: Permitting
compensation to plaintiffs outside the zone of danger would often
allow recovery to individuals who were undeserving."0
Moreover, the court envisioned that economic activity might
be discouraged by the imposition of rising insurance premiums in
order for individuals to acquire protection from an extension of
liability." Considering the moral culpability of defendant's
conduct, the A maya court adjudged that a negligent act was less
blameworthy than intentional misconduct; therefore the negligent
tort-feasor should be subjected to a narrower margin of liability
than that imposed on an intentional wrongdoer.' 2
In Dillon v. Legg, the California Supreme Court has
reconsidered these same public policy questions and has reversed its
holding in A maya contrary to the weight of judicial authority.
Rejecting the notion that administrative problems would
render effective adjudication impossible, the Dillon court concluded
9. The court used the word "psychoneural" which may be a misnomer for
psychoneurotic. A "psychoneurotic disorder" refers to one who is suffering from a

psychoneurosis which is an emotional disorder of varying intensity.
DICTIONARY 1322 (2d ed. 1966).

STEDNIAN'S MEDICAL

10. 59 Cal. 2d at 312, 379 P.2d at 523, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
11. Id. at 314, 379 P.2d at 525, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
12. Id. at 315, 379 P.2d 525, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 46 (1965):
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to
liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the
time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in
bodily harm.
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that the possibility of fictitious claims should not preclude the
recovery by those individuals who have suffered serious injury, and
that juries can effectively distinguish fraudulent from legitimate
claims.' 3 It has also determined that an extension of liability will
not deter economic incentive or unduly burden the defendant.
The Dillon court set forth a foreseeability standard to
determine the limits of recovery for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress. The question of plaintiffs foreseeability will be
resolved by considering (1) his proximity to the scene of the
accident; (2) the manner in which the emotional shock occurred;
4
and (3) the relationship of the plaintiff to the victim.'
Thus, the Dillon court-recognizing that a defendant's
negligence may foreseeably cause a shock which results in physical
injury to the plaintiff who is not within the zone of danger-has
created a general duty of care which the law of torts has not
previously imposed. The scope of liability is measured by a
determination of whether the defendant's action foreseeably caused
an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff, not by a rigid
standard of whether the plaintiff was in the zone of physical danger.
The future significance of Dillon v. Legg lies in the unanswered
question as to what factual circumstances will enable a particular
plaintiff to recover. The following hypothetical factual situations
may illustrate the potential ramifications. A young child C is
seriously injured in an automobile accident caused by the negligent
13. 68 Adv. Cal. at 774-75, 441 P.2d at 917, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78. The court relies on
Dean Prosser for support of its contention that the mother who witnesses the death of her
child may suffer a legitimate, compensable harm. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 55 (3d ed.
1964).
14. 68 Adv. Cal. at 779, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-8 I.
In determining . . . whether defendant should reasonably foresee the injury to
plaintiff, . . . the courts will take into account . . . (I) Whether plaintiff was
located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance
away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact
upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the
accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its
occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and victim were closely related, as contrasted
with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship.
The evaluation of these factors will indicate the degree of the defendant's
foreseeability. . ..
Prior to the Dillon decision, Dean Prosser realized the inadequacies of the zone of
danger limitation and suggested a test similar to that adopted in Dillon. He suggested that
only fairly contemporaneous emotional distress to members of the injured party's immediate
family would receive compensation under a foreseeability test. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
§ 55 (3ded. 1964).
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driving of X and: (1) her mother M, her niece N, and her friend F,
who witness the accident, were not within the zone of danger but
were in close proximity.'5 Applying the foreseeability test to this
first fact situation, M would recover under the limited Dillon
holding. N would probably recover since she is a close relative near
the scene of the accident. F would probably recover although the
absence of a close relationship to C would weigh against her foreseeability; (2) M, N and F, who are in M's house and hear the
accident, rush out to view the injured C. In the second fact
situation, the issue as to M and N's recovery is not as clear.
Although M did not witness the accident, the defendant may
reasonably foresee that a mother of the victim-upon hearing the
screech of an automobile's sudden stop and coming upon the
scene-will suffer emotional upset. Similarly, N's injuries may be
foreseeable but her more distant relationship to C, as compared to
M's relationship, will militate against her recovery. F would
probably be denied compensation since she did not observe the
collision and is not a relative of C; (3) M, N and F, who do not see
or hear the collision, are informed of the accident and view the
injured victim in the hospital. In the third fact situation, an
important consideration may be the length of time elapsing between
the occurrence of the accident and when the plaintiffs are informed
or when they view the injured victim. While the determining factor
might be the plaintiff's relationship to the victim, the lack of a
contemporaneous observance as well as the lack of a close
proximity to the accident will probably result in a denial of
recovery to all plaintiffs.
A discussion of the hypothetical cases indicates that the Dillon
test will probably yield recovery for the harm incurred only under
circumstances similar to the first and second fact patterns. Thus, it
may be predicted, that the application of a foreseeability standard
will not substantially increase the defendant's liability. Moreover,
the application of the traditional foreseeability test provides a more
flexible standard than the zone of danger concept; the trier of fact
15. The hypothetical factual situations assume that M, N and F suffer emotional
distress resulting in physical injuries upon viewing C. The Dillon opinion limited recovery to

plaintiffs who suffer accompanying physical injuries. See

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF

ToRTs § 436(A) comment (b) (1965). Furthermore, it is also assumed that C is not
contributorily negligent. The Dillon court maintained that if she were contributorily
negligent, recovery would be denied any third party who suffered emotional distress as a
result of the defendant's negligence. 68 Adv. Cal. at 771, 779, 44! P.2d at 916, 920, 69
Cal. Rptr. at 76, 80.
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may now balance several relevant circumstances in evaluating the
merits of plaintiffs claim rather than apply an arbitrary limitation
on the defendant's legal duty to exercise reasonable care. As the
factual pattern in Dillon vividly illustrates, and as the California
Supreme Court emphasized in its opinion, California courts will be
able in the future to avoid anomalous holdings such as denying
compensation to a mother who observed the horror of her
daughter's death on the street from the vantage point of her porch
step, while granting recovery to the decedent's sister who was within
6
the zone of danger.1
Dillon v. Legg represents the California judicial trend toward
eliminating artificial limitations on the general tort duty of care.
Subsequent to the Dillon decision, the California Supreme Court in
Rowland v. Christian overturned the traditional no duty
limitations in the area of owners and occupiers of land.'7 The court
still refuses to impose a legal obligation to extricate a person who is
in peril. Perhaps Dillon and Rowland portend the eventual
abrogation of the last major no duty limitation remaining in
California.
RICHARD ALAN BERMAN
16. Id. at 771, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
17. 69 Adv. Cal. 89,443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).

